

Top-down or bottom-up? The selection of shadow rapporteurs in the European Parliament

Online appendix

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Appendix 1: Bivariate associations by party group

Figures A1 to A7 are bivariate scatterplots of shadow rapporteurship appointment and different explanatory variables. The plots show vertically jittered points, overlaid by a non-linear smoother with 95% confidence interval. Figure A8 plots the difference in the proportion of shadow rapporteurs between mixed and shared nationality dyads. Only the scatterplot of similar policy interests of Figure A7 shows a consistent and substantially large relationship with shadow rapporteurship appointment.




Figure A1: Left-right distance to party group median




Figure A2: EU support distance to party group median




Figure A3: GAL/TAN distance to party group median




Figure A4: Left-right distance to rapporteur




Figure A5: EU support distance to rapporteur




Figure A6: GAL/TAN distance to rapporteur




Figure A7: Similarity of policy interests




Figure A8: Coincidence of national policy salience

Appendix 2: Robustness tests

The tables in this appendix present the results of a number of robustness tests. Tables A1 to A3 address concerns about the potential endogeneity of the policy interest similarity variable. Table A1 presents the result when policy interest similarity is only based on common links to policy topics created through work on non-codecision files. Table A2 goes one step further in limiting the basis for common policy topic links by focusing on those that were created through work on own-initiative files only. Arguably, involvement in non-binding files that are of less importance to the party leadership and provide little electoral or office benefits to individual MEPs provide the clearest signal of their policy interests. Finally, the direction of causality, Table A3 provides the results of an analysis of the selection of shadow rapporteurs in 2013 and 2014, using a measure of policy interest similarity that only takes common policy topic links into account that were created through the involvement in reports and opinions before 2013. The analysis results are generally robust to these different measurement strategies. The estimated effect size for policy similarity interest decreases in all instances. However, it never reverses its sign and, with the exception of a single party group coefficient in the ‘own-initiative only’ specification (Table A2), always remains statistically significant.

Finally, Table A4 presents the results of an analysis that uses EP roll call vote data rather than expert estimates for measuring the top-down delegation variables. More specifically, the variables indicating MEPs’ distance to the rapporteur and to their party group median are based on two-dimensional WNominate scores estimated from the full roll call vote record of the 7th term of the EP. We created these estimates using the software’s default settings. The first dimension has acceptable face validity and clearly represents a general left-right dimension. In past research, the second dimension has usually been interpreted as a pro-/anti-EU dimension. For the purposes of this robustness test, we follow this precedence. However, it should be noted that the relative location of several party groups do not cohere with common perceptions of their degree of Euroscepticism (e.g. the WNominate scores indicate that the ALDE is more Eurosceptic than the EPP and the S&D, and the Greens are more Eurosceptic than the ERC, EFD, and GUE-NGL). Another disadvantage of using roll call vote data is that it does not allow us to locate MEPs’ positions on the GAL/TAN dimension. Thus, the corresponding position variables are not included in the model specification. It should also be noted that some of the party group model estimates are plagued by multicollinearity, as indicated by inflated coefficients and standard errors. This is most likely the consequence of little within-party group variation in left-right scores. All in all, the results of the analysis strengthen our contention that

top-down delegation variables do not play a role in determining the selection of shadow rapporteurs. All the statistically significant estimates show effects in the opposite direction from those postulated by principal-agent hypotheses. At the same time, the effects for policy interest similarity reduce only marginally in size and remain statistically significant.

Table A1 Policy interest similarity variable based on non-codecision policy topics

	Full Sample	GUE-NGL	Greens	S&D	ALDE	EPP	ECR
<i>Top-Down</i>							
Distance to Party Group							
Left-Right	0.97 (0.05)	1.25 (0.47)	1.09 (0.12)	1.32 (0.30)	0.79* (0.09)	0.69* (0.12)	1.01 (0.36)
EU Support	0.78*** (0.04)	1.06 (0.33)	0.82 (0.12)	0.41*** (0.10)	1.60** (0.29)	0.76 (0.13)	0.43** (0.14)
GAL/TAN	0.91** (0.03)	1.18 (0.15)	0.75 (0.12)	0.98 (0.10)	0.92 (0.06)	0.99 (0.11)	0.61* (0.12)
Distance to Rapporteur							
Left-Right	1.04 (0.04)	1.20 (0.36)	1.09 (0.13)	0.66** (0.10)	1.08 (0.07)	0.98 (0.11)	1.07 (0.16)
EU Support	1.02 (0.05)	0.60* (0.15)	1.21 (0.15)	1.16 (0.22)	1.09 (0.15)	0.81 (0.10)	0.93 (0.27)
GAL/TAN	0.99 (0.03)	0.82* (0.07)	1.47* (0.25)	0.88 (0.06)	1.07 (0.05)	0.98 (0.07)	1.19 (0.17)
<i>Bottom-Up</i>							
Similar National Saliency	1.11 (0.11)	1.01 (0.31)	1.16 (0.27)	1.32 (0.29)	0.97 (0.21)	1.36 (0.32)	1.01 (0.37)
Similar Policy Interests	1.02*** (0.00)	1.03*** (0.01)	1.02*** (0.01)	1.02*** (0.00)	1.02*** (0.00)	1.02*** (0.00)	1.02*** (0.01)
<i>Control variables</i>							
Seniority	1.04 (0.03)	1.08 (0.17)	1.33** (0.12)	0.99 (0.07)	0.92 (0.07)	0.99 (0.06)	0.97 (0.07)
Committee Leader	1.00 (0.09)	0.50 (0.35)	0.85 (0.22)	0.70 (0.16)	1.16 (0.24)	1.23 (0.30)	1.07 (0.22)
National Delegation Size	0.95 (0.03)	1.15 (0.26)	0.96 (0.09)	0.83* (0.07)	1.23* (0.12)	0.90 (0.06)	0.82 (0.10)
Substitute Member	0.40*** (0.02)	0.47*** (0.08)	0.42*** (0.06)	0.37*** (0.05)	0.37*** (0.05)	0.56*** (0.08)	0.31*** (0.05)
Party Group Leader	1.00 (0.06)	1.06 (0.23)	0.58* (0.13)	1.30 (0.40)	0.85 (0.11)	1.11 (0.16)	2.00*** (0.32)
Vote Absenteeism	0.83*** (0.04)	0.93 (0.24)	0.48*** (0.08)	1.07 (0.10)	0.81* (0.08)	1.04 (0.10)	1.00 (0.15)
AIC	7385.27	566.98	979.32	1569.12	1461.44	1682.73	936.56
No. of appointment	1854	245	317	273	358	254	308
No. of observations	23737	1026	2144	6305	3546	8274	2152
Missings	2735	176	244	667	243	966	310

Notes: Statistical significance: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$; the dependent variable indicates the appointment of an MEP as shadow rapporteur for a particular codecision report; cell entries present odds ratios and standard errors are reported in parentheses; all model specifications include a stratification variable that captures the relevant choice set: MEPs of a particular party group in a particular committee being potentially appointed as shadow rapporteur for a report the committee is currently dealing with; the sample consists of dyads of rapporteurs and potential shadow rapporteurs from other party groups in the same committee. Note that the results of a separate analysis for the EFD is not reported, as a small sample size and limited variability in values of explanatory variables combine to produce high multicollinearity and thus inflated coefficient and standard error estimates. The EFD observations are included in the full sample.

Table A2 Policy interest similarity variable based on own-initiative policy topics

	Full Sample	GUE-NGL	Greens	S&D	ALDE	EPP	ECR
<i>Top-Down</i>							
Distance to Party Group							
Left-Right	0.95 (0.05)	1.21 (0.45)	1.07 (0.12)	1.34 (0.30)	0.81 (0.10)	0.69* (0.12)	1.05 (0.37)
EU Support	0.77*** (0.04)	1.07 (0.33)	0.81 (0.12)	0.41*** (0.10)	1.53* (0.27)	0.76 (0.13)	0.43** (0.14)
GAL/TAN	0.91** (0.03)	1.20 (0.15)	0.76 (0.12)	0.97 (0.10)	0.93 (0.06)	1.01 (0.11)	0.59** (0.12)
Distance to Rapporteur							
Left-Right	1.04 (0.04)	1.20 (0.37)	1.10 (0.13)	0.65** (0.09)	1.08 (0.07)	0.97 (0.11)	1.09 (0.16)
EU Support	1.02 (0.05)	0.59* (0.14)	1.22 (0.15)	1.17 (0.22)	1.12 (0.16)	0.81 (0.10)	0.91 (0.27)
GAL/TAN	0.99 (0.03)	0.82* (0.07)	1.45* (0.25)	0.87* (0.06)	1.07 (0.05)	0.97 (0.07)	1.21 (0.18)
<i>Bottom-Up</i>							
Similar National Saliency	1.11 (0.11)	1.00 (0.30)	1.16 (0.27)	1.31 (0.29)	0.99 (0.22)	1.37 (0.32)	0.94 (0.35)
Similar Policy Interests	1.02*** (0.00)	1.02** (0.01)	1.02*** (0.01)	1.02*** (0.00)	1.01 (0.00)	1.01* (0.00)	1.02*** (0.01)
<i>Control variables</i>							
Seniority	1.05 (0.03)	1.06 (0.17)	1.31** (0.12)	0.98 (0.07)	0.92 (0.07)	1.00 (0.06)	1.00 (0.07)
Committee Leader	1.00 (0.09)	0.49 (0.35)	0.87 (0.22)	0.72 (0.17)	1.12 (0.23)	1.22 (0.29)	1.11 (0.23)
National Delegation Size	0.94 (0.03)	1.20 (0.27)	0.96 (0.09)	0.83* (0.07)	1.23* (0.12)	0.89 (0.06)	0.83 (0.10)
Substitute Member	0.38*** (0.02)	0.42*** (0.07)	0.41*** (0.06)	0.37*** (0.05)	0.34*** (0.04)	0.52*** (0.07)	0.30*** (0.05)
Party Group Leader	0.98 (0.06)	1.09 (0.24)	0.59* (0.13)	1.22 (0.38)	0.84 (0.11)	1.12 (0.16)	1.96*** (0.31)
Vote Absenteeism	0.82*** (0.04)	0.89 (0.23)	0.48*** (0.08)	1.05 (0.10)	0.79* (0.08)	1.02 (0.10)	1.02 (0.15)
AIC	7420.32	574.56	979.78	1565.79	1471.85	1692.69	938.29
No. of appointment	1854	245	317	273	358	254	308
No. of observations	23736	1026	2144	6304	3546	8274	2152
Missings	2736	176	244	668	243	966	310

Notes: Statistical significance: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$; the dependent variable indicates the appointment of an MEP as shadow rapporteur for a particular codecision report; cell entries present odds ratios and standard errors are reported in parentheses; all model specifications include a stratification variable that captures the relevant choice set: MEPs of a particular party group in a particular committee being potentially appointed as shadow rapporteur for a report the committee is currently dealing with; the sample consists of dyads of rapporteurs and potential shadow rapporteurs from other party groups in the same committee. Note that the results of a separate analysis for the EFD is not reported, as a small sample size and limited variability in values of explanatory variables combine to produce high multicollinearity and thus inflated coefficient and standard error estimates. The EFD observations are included in the full sample.

Table A3 Policy interest similarity variable based on pre-2013 policy topics, explaining shadow rapporteur appointments in 2013 and 2014

	Full Sample	GUE-NGL	Greens	S&D	ALDE	EPP	ECR
<i>Top-Down</i>							
Distance to Party Group							
Left-Right	0.98 (0.08)	2.28 (1.24)	0.87 (0.16)	1.02 (0.30)	0.82 (0.15)	0.54* (0.14)	2.59 (1.48)
EU Support	0.80** (0.06)	0.86 (0.36)	0.91 (0.20)	0.40** (0.12)	1.87* (0.45)	0.52** (0.13)	0.29* (0.15)
GAL/TAN	0.88* (0.04)	1.17 (0.23)	0.35* (0.17)	0.85 (0.12)	0.90 (0.09)	1.16 (0.19)	0.35** (0.14)
Distance to Rapporteur							
Left-Right	1.06 (0.06)	1.62 (0.72)	0.81 (0.14)	0.70 (0.14)	1.14 (0.10)	1.25 (0.20)	1.30 (0.30)
EU Support	1.01 (0.06)	0.29*** (0.10)	1.26 (0.23)	1.09 (0.27)	0.83 (0.15)	0.83 (0.15)	0.87 (0.37)
GAL/TAN	1.01 (0.04)	0.75* (0.09)	1.68 (0.49)	0.89 (0.09)	1.10 (0.08)	0.96 (0.09)	1.62 (0.49)
<i>Bottom-Up</i>							
Similar National Salience	1.17 (0.16)	0.89 (0.36)	1.12 (0.36)	1.25 (0.36)	0.92 (0.29)	1.98* (0.60)	2.21 (1.27)
Similar Policy Interests	1.02*** (0.00)	1.03** (0.01)	1.02** (0.01)	1.01* (0.01)	1.02** (0.01)	1.02** (0.01)	1.03*** (0.01)
<i>Control variables</i>							
Seniority	1.05 (0.04)	1.17 (0.29)	1.11 (0.14)	0.98 (0.09)	0.97 (0.11)	1.07 (0.09)	1.08 (0.12)
Committee Leader	1.14 (0.14)	0.74 (0.66)	1.49 (0.51)	0.92 (0.26)	1.93* (0.53)	0.88 (0.33)	0.85 (0.27)
National Delegation Size	0.96 (0.04)	0.86 (0.25)	0.79 (0.10)	0.88 (0.09)	1.36* (0.19)	0.84 (0.08)	0.91 (0.18)
Substitute Member	0.42*** (0.03)	0.48** (0.13)	0.61* (0.13)	0.35*** (0.07)	0.44*** (0.09)	0.64* (0.12)	0.24*** (0.06)
Party Group Leader	1.02 (0.09)	0.83 (0.32)	0.50* (0.16)	1.92 (0.70)	0.76 (0.15)	1.00 (0.20)	3.28*** (0.80)
Vote Absenteeism	0.88* (0.05)	1.36 (0.63)	0.68 (0.14)	1.21 (0.16)	0.72* (0.11)	0.91 (0.13)	1.36 (0.32)
AIC	3799.17	292.46	540.54	871.38	715.56	851.98	427.57
No. of appointment	955	132	165	149	173	128	159
No. of observations	12551	519	1146	3438	1833	4355	1121
Missings	1677	102	172	456	151	561	168

Notes: Statistical significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05; the dependent variable indicates the appointment of an MEP as shadow rapporteur for a particular codecision report; cell entries present odds ratios and standard errors are reported in parentheses; all model specifications include a stratification variable that captures the relevant choice set: MEPs of a particular party group in a particular committee being potentially appointed as shadow rapporteur for a report the committee is currently dealing with; the sample consists of dyads of rapporteurs and potential shadow rapporteurs from other party groups in the same committee. Note that the results of a separate analysis for the EFD is not reported, as a small sample size and limited variability in values of explanatory variables combine to produce high multicollinearity and thus inflated coefficient and standard error estimates. The EFD observations are included in the full sample.

Table A4 Top-down delegation variables based on WNominate ideal point estimates

	Full Sample	GUE-NGL	Greens	S&D	ALDE	EPP	ECR
<i>Top-Down</i>							
Distance to Party Group							
Left-Right	0.46 (0.26)	6.53 (8.63)	0.21 (0.64)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00* (0.01)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)
EU Support	0.91 (0.19)	1.47 (1.15)	0.01 (0.03)	1.36 (0.54)	0.47 (0.46)	1.87 (1.27)	0.81 (0.81)
Distance to Rapporteur							
Left-Right	0.72 (0.35)	0.47 (0.58)	42.09 (98.24)	11.79 (56.49)	0.08 (0.18)	0.00 (0.00)	0.07 (0.31)
EU Support	1.45* (0.25)	1.10 (0.48)	0.67 (0.99)	1.30 (0.41)	1.20 (0.81)	0.70 (0.48)	9.24*** (5.42)
<i>Bottom-Up</i>							
Similar National	1.03 (0.10)	1.02 (0.31)	0.92 (0.21)	1.31 (0.29)	0.91 (0.20)	1.21 (0.28)	1.03 (0.36)
Similar Policy Interests	1.07*** (0.00)	1.06*** (0.01)	1.06*** (0.01)	1.07*** (0.00)	1.06*** (0.01)	1.07*** (0.00)	1.06*** (0.01)
<i>Control variables</i>							
Seniority	0.99 (0.03)	1.06 (0.16)	1.20* (0.10)	0.94 (0.06)	0.93 (0.07)	0.93 (0.05)	0.98 (0.07)
Committee Leader	0.91 (0.08)	0.92 (0.53)	0.72 (0.20)	0.50** (0.12)	1.03 (0.21)	0.86 (0.21)	1.08 (0.22)
National Delegation Size	1.00 (0.03)	1.05 (0.15)	0.96 (0.07)	0.80** (0.06)	1.04 (0.08)	1.07 (0.07)	1.11 (0.10)
Substitute Member	0.61*** (0.04)	0.65** (0.11)	0.57*** (0.09)	0.53*** (0.07)	0.57*** (0.08)	0.79 (0.11)	0.56*** (0.09)
Party Group Leader	1.00 (0.06)	1.05 (0.19)	0.69 (0.15)	1.18 (0.36)	0.85 (0.11)	0.96 (0.14)	1.59** (0.25)
Vote Absenteeism	0.89** (0.04)	0.86 (0.17)	0.55*** (0.09)	1.18 (0.12)	0.91 (0.09)	1.00 (0.10)	0.95 (0.14)
AIC	7447.11	645.67	1034.74	1544.32	1446.78	1624.43	1011.82
No. of appointment	2040	285	349	297	383	277	341
No. of observations	26344	1202	2388	6972	3789	9240	2431
Missings	128	0	0	0	0	0	31

Notes: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05; the dependent variable indicates the appointment of an MEP as shadow rapporteur for a particular codecision report; cell entries present odds ratios and standard errors are reported in parentheses; all model specifications include a stratification variable that captures the relevant choice set: MEPs of a particular party group in a particular committee being potentially appointed as shadow rapporteur for a report the committee is currently dealing with; the sample consists of dyads of rapporteurs and potential shadow rapporteurs from other party groups in the same committee. Note that the results of a separate analysis for the EFD is not reported, as a small sample size and limited variability in values of explanatory variables combine to produce high multicollinearity and thus inflated coefficient and standard error estimates. The EFD observations are included in the full sample.